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Abstract
The paper presents a simple model of a transitional economy 
with many state-owned enterprises (SO E ) whose economic value 
is initially unknown. The lack o f the information about value of 
SO E ’s impedes privatization by sales. The government decides 
on the optimal sequence o f privatization o f SO E ’s according to 
the following two criteria: (1 ) the initial privatization o f some 
SO E ’s should provide the maximal informational gain; (2 ) an op­
timal privatization program should maximize the government’s 
revenues from the privatization o f all SOE ’s. The main results 
o f the paper are two-fold: first, the optimal sequence o f privati­
zation is formally related to the structure o f industrial relations 
within the economy, second, the paper characterizes computa­
tional methods that can solve the government’s problem. It is 
shown that the capability o f the government to define the optimal 
sequence o f privatization is lim ited by the com plexity o f the pro­
blem and the efficiency o f a solution method. The paper develops
T  am greatly indebted to S. Vassilakis for his many invaluable suggestions through 
my work on this paper. I wish, as well, to thank J. Micklewright, Y . Gonzales de Lara 
and C. Upper for their comments and the participants of the EUI student workshop 



























































































problem-solving techniques that help to overcome the com plexity 
constraints. These techniques are characterized in terms o f the 





























































































The issue of privatization in transitional economies of Eastern Europe in­
evitably gives rise to three principal questions about the necessity, speed 
and sequencing of the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The main 
body of the literature on transition has concentrated so far on the first 
two questions. This might be the case because the last question, about 
the optimal sequencing of privatization, is meaningful only if privatiza­
tion is proved to be necessary for successful transition and if its progress 
is gradual enough to make its sequencing non-trivial. However, recent 
advances in research about transition confirm the importance of the op­
timal sequencing of privatization.
It is no exaggeration to say that there exists a universal agreement 
about the necessity of privatization in transitional economies. The second 
question about the speed of privatization is more controversial. One of 
the most disputed points about transition is whether privatization should 
be a gradual process (exemplary for this point of view is Roland (1994)) 
or whether it should be accomplished swiftly (as argued by Frydman et 
al. (1994)). However, available evidence suggests that privatization in 
Eastern Europe proceeds slowly enough to make the question about the 
sequencing of privatization relevant. This paper thus takes as a given 
that private ownership is the long-run goal but that the divesture of the 
government’s assets is not instantaneous, and will concentrate on the 
optimal sequencing of privatization. More precisely, I will look at the 
optimal sequencing of privatization in the context of the optimal plan of 
reforms designed by the government.
I am following here those researchers who view a coherent plan of 



























































































economies of Eastern Europe are quite complicated, heavily distorted sy­
stems that cannot be left to themselves to develop some sort of market 
capitalism from scratch. In the words of Frydman et al. (1993 p.76): 
“Paradoxically, the most important aspects of the transition to a sponta­
neously functioning market economy cannot be initiated by the market 
forces themselves. Indeed, the only force powerful enough to set the mar­
ket forces in motion is the very state which is supposed to remove itself 
from the picture” . How can the government proceed with the design of 
privatization?
There exists a growing body of recent economic literature that in­
dicates a number of issues that the government should take into account 
in making a privatization decision. Glaeser et al. (1994) found that pri­
vatization of downstream firms should proceed before the privatization 
of upstream firms because downstream firms are subject to greater de­
mand shocks. Their argument rests on the conjecture that private firms 
adapt to the shock better than state-owned firms; if the government can 
privatize only a limited number of firms at the beginning of transition 
process, it should privatize downstream firms first.
Roland (1994) looks at the political issues that determine the op­
timal sequence of privatization. He argues that any privatization plan 
designed by the government should be politically feasible, i.e. it should 
have enough support among voters. In order to build up a constituency of 
reforms privatization should start with the firms that are expected to be 
most profitable in private hands. First of all, privatization of such firms 
will not have any negative effect on employment, hence the government 
will not risk any political backlash at the beginning of the reforms pro­
cess. Second, the government can raise revenues for the budget through 
the sale of potentially profitable firms. In general then, the initial success 
of reforms builds up support for further reforms.
However useful and interesting, this line of research largely ignores 
the fact that each individual firm operates in a complex framework of 
industrial relations within the economy; the question of the privatization 
of a given firm is considered within a partial equilibrium framework. 




























































































the designing of privatization reforms -  is omitted from mathematical 
models. This paper is intended to bridge this gap.
I adopt a simple model of a transitional economy that allows for 
the existence of a large number of firms which are related through a 
complex network of technological links. The objective of the govern­
ment -  defining the optimal sequencing of privatization -  is formalized 
as a constraint satisfaction optimization problem. Such a setup allows 
us to specify a mapping from the structure of industrial relations in the 
economy to the optimal sequence of privatization. However, finding a 
solution of the problem is a complex task. Because of the size of the 
problem none of the existing algorithms guarantees finding a solution in 
a reasonable amount of time. Overcoming complexity constraints mo­
tivates the development of problem-solving techniques mainly based on 
the decomposition of the problem. These problem-solving techniques 
can be related to the organization of the government’s administration 
responsible for the development of a privatization program. It appears 
that the decentralized structure of the government’s administration is 
optimal from the point of view of algorithmic efficiency.
The following section of the paper presents several stylized facts 
about transitional economies in Eastern Europe. The third section for­
malizes the argument and specifies the government’s problem. Sections 
4 and 5 explore solution methods and their complexity. Section 6 relates 
the solution methods to the structure of an administrative organization. 
Section 7 provides some discussion and possible extensions. Section 8 
concludes.
2. Privatization in Transitional Economies: 
Some Stylized Facts.
There exists a substantial empirical literature about privatization in tran­
sitional economies. There are several case studies (for example, Boycko 
et al. (1994)) that describe recent privatization programs in several East 




























































































(1992), Rostowski (1993)) provides useful information about the econo­
mic environments in these countries1. The model that I introduce later 
in the paper is based on the findings of this literature, so I will briefly 
summarize the main results that I use.
The first point is that designing a program for the privatization of 
public assets is a complex decision problem that involves many discretio­
nary decisions about timing and method of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. For example, in the Czech Republic there were two waves 
of voucher privatization of industrial firms, first in 1992-1993, then in 
1994-1995. The first wave involved over 1000 companies, the second 861 
companies. After the completion of the second wave of voucher privatiza­
tion, an estimated 2,000 enterprises remain under state ownership while 
1,426 are owned by the Czech privatization body -  National Property 
Fund, and according to the Czech government, the final goal is to have 
only four enterprises under state ownership (EIU Country Report 1995).
In Russia the voucher program of mass privatization proceeded in 
one round from 1992 and ended formally before the end of 1994, but the 
privatization continued through conventional methods. A total number 
of 11,463 enterprises was involved in the mass privatization process at 
the end of December 1993. (Bornstein (1994)). In the middle of 1995 
the Russian government started implementing the program of asset sa­
les through public offering, direct sales and floating shares on the stock 
exchange.
In Poland, despite the significant progress in macroeconomic stabi­
lization and liberalization, privatization is slower. The first attempts to 
privatize industrial enterprises through public offering took place in 1990, 
but since sales were considered largely to be a failure due to the lack of 
customers’ interest, the privatization program was amended in favor of 
voucher privatization. A new mass privatization program started in 1995 
with distribution of vouchers to the population. The program calls for 
initial privatization of 413 large industrial firms.
11 limit myself to the discussion on Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia -  coun­
tries that axe probably best studied in the empirical economic literature on transition 




























































































The second point is that the privatization program has to take into 
account obstacles and constraints that prevent the efficient transfer of 
the public property to the private sector. This issue is well developed in 
the literature about privatization (for example, Frydman et al. (1994) 
and Rostowski (1993)). I will concentrate on one of the most important 
problems that it identifies -  the informational problem.
It is generally well-recognized that in a transitional economy one 
of the major obstacles to the sale of a public firm to private investor 
is insufficient information on the firm’s economic value (Roland(1994) 
and Begg et al.(1992)). Economic valuation of the public firm is difficult 
because of the number of the microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, 
such as macroeconomic instability, the lack of the history of enterprise 
performance under market conditions, and enterprise debts. Referring to 
the later problem -  indebtedness of state firms -  Begg et al. (1992 p.26) 
point out that: “It is harder to privatize firms if their balance sheets are 
encumbered by inherited debt -  indeed their accounting net worth may 
be negative, even if they can be expected to make operating profits” .
Enterprise debts have two components: indebtedness to banks (state 
and private) and interfirm debts. The former problem and its possible 
solutions are described in Begg et al. (1992) and Rostowski (1993). I will 
concentrate on the later problem -  the lack of information on the firm’s 
profitability due to “interfirm credit” , i.e. “a chain of mutual indebted­
ness among the companies along the production process” (Frydman et 
al. (1994)).
According to Frydman et al. (1994,p.84): “In this arrangement 
[interfirm credit] firms extend credit to their customers and become in 
turn indebted to their suppliers. Many of the firms show paper profits, 
but in fact a large proportion of their assets consists in indebtedness of 
other enterprises, which axe in turn linked in this way to others etc. As 
a result, the solvency of any particular link in this chain is related to all 
the others, and no one really knows which are still viable.” And further: 
“ [the public firm] continued production and kept the unpaid debts on the 




























































































the same fashion. Since these intercompany debts came to constitute a 
substantial portion of the assets of most state enterprises, they linked the 
solvency of the enterprise together, and made any evaluation of individual 
company very difficult (not only because its solvency may have been 
illusory, but also because the customers might not be able or willing to 
take its products if they were to be forced to pay for them in cash) (p. 
131)” .
Why is a state firm willing to extend interfirm credit? According 
to Rostowski (1993), state firms are ready to accumulate debts only to 
continue production because there does not exist an effective system of 
bankruptcy for insolvent public enterprises and because managers of the 
state firms “will attempt to avoid the conflicts with the workforce over 
nominal wages” (Rostowski (1993,p.10)). To finance the credit extensions 
the state firms do not usually pay their suppliers, which are in turn ready 
to extend credit to them: “ ... [in the post-communist economy] state 
enterprises become free to extend inter enterprise credit. If this is followed 
shortly after by a credit squeeze as a part of a stabilization program, 
state enterprises may initially be willing to muddle through and avoid 
adjustment by both taking on inter-enterprise debt and extending inter- 
enterprise credit without much concern about whether this is financially 
optimal or not, as long as there is a general belief in the impermanence 
of the credit squeeze. (Rostowski (1993,p.9 ))” The overall impression 
is then that state-owned firms behave as if they were the divisions of 
a single state-run giant enterprise where a single branch does not bear 
individual financial responsibility.
The debt problem comprises two aspects: first, firms have a stock 
of accumulated debt, and second, this stock grows due to the continuing 
extension of the interfirm credit. The later aspect is fundamental in the 
sense that even if the stock of the interfirm debt is written off in some 
way, the problem will reappear again when the new debt accumulates. 
Hence to find a permanent solution to the interfirm debt problem it is 
not enough to cancel in some way existing debt; it is instead necessary 
to find an arrangement that changes the credit extension practice of the 




























































































government regulation, recapitalization of firms and privatization as a 
solution to the enterprise debt problem.
This brings us to the third point, that the privatization program 
may be designed to overcome the constraints that limit privatization in 
the first place. According to Frydman et al. (1994) a privatization plan 
should be designed so that the government will obtain additional infor­
mation after the implementation of initial stages of the reform. “ [Initial 
reforms] must reduce the unacceptably high level of uncertainty at the 
point of departure. This means that the design must contain mechanisms 
that reveal as much information as possible in the early stages of reform 
process (Frydman et al. (1994p.78)).” Additional information may be 
generated if the debt problem in the transitional economy is alleviated. 
The remedy for the debt problem may be the initial property reforms. 
First, privatization of a state-owned firm signals the commitment of the 
government not to subsidize this firm and thus limits its incentives to 
extend credit to other firms. Second, privatization may change as well 
the behavior of firms that remain state-owned since privatization changes 
the economic environment where they operate.
Indeed Stiglitz (1993 p.187) writes: “I want to argue that the gover­
nment does have a marked disadvantage relative to private firms ... based 
on the inability of the government to make certain commitments, in par­
ticular, the commitment .. .not to subsidy” . If privatization means the 
commitment not to subsidize a privatized firm, then a privatized firm will 
not extend credit to its trade partners as it did before the privatization. 
Moreover, the initial privatization of some firms changes the economic 
environment in general -  the economy cannot be regarded any more as 
a single giant enterprise owned and financed by the state.
The idea that the behavior of state firms depends not only on their 
internal structure including the ownership form but also on the economic 
environment where they operate is well recognized. According to Balce- 
rowicz (1993): “ ... a change in the [internal] structure of one group of 
enterprises changes their behavior, and in this way the environment of 




























































































may alter incentives of the firms remaining in the state property. The 
remaining state firms that have to deal with private firms do not regard 
themselves any more as a branch of a single state firm without individual 
financial responsibility. The perception of a private trade partner as an 
alien element in the established system of cross-subsidizations will make 
a state firm reluctant to extend credit to a private firm. Additionally, a 
private firm itself may be reluctant to accumulate unpaid debts because 
it would risk bankruptcy. The government which signalled its commit­
ment not to subsidize a firm by privatizing it may be expected to be 
tougher in pursuing its liquidation than in the case of a state firm.
Initial privatization then should be aimed at isolating a state firm 
from trade with other state firms. In this way the privatization of 
some firms may help to overcome the problem of the interfirm cross­
subsidization, and more generally the problem of deficient information 
in the transitional economy. The necessary initial mass of privatization 
that creates a “market environment” is achieved by voucher or “mass” 
privatization -  a virtually free distribution of the public assets to the 
private sector that does not require information on the economic value of 
the distributed property. However, mass privatization has certain draw­
backs, for example, the government essentially receives no revenues from 
privatization which we might well take to be an important consideration 
for the government. In fact, in most transitional economies the govern­
ment usually prefers sales to give-away distribution at the later stages of 
a privatization program.
The above discussion suggests that the government can design a 
privatization scheme such that privatization in the first period reduces 
uncertainty about the firms’ performance in the second period, thus ma­
king privatization in the second period profitable for the government. It 
is assumed that the government designs an optimal privatization plan 
according to this concept. It looks like very simple, even trivial exercise 
since the government’s objective is assumed to be simple. However, the 
government needs to take thousands decisions about the privatization of 




























































































are interdependent -  hence the government’s problem is in reality a com­
plex problem. It is difficult to say anything more about complexity of the 
optimal reform design without introducing formal argumentation. Hence 
I need to formulate a simple framework where the complex nature of the 
economic transformation design is explicitly recognized.
The mathematical model presented in the next section serves this 
purpose. It allows, first, the government’s privatization strategy to be 
formalized and, second, to show that the government’s ability to design 
an optimal reform plan is bounded by the complexity of the problem.
3. The model
Consider a closed transitional economy with n firms, each firm having 
a technology described by the production possibilities set (a set of all 
feasible production plans)
Yi =  { ( q l , . . . , q î , . . . , q r - 9 i . ( 1)
Let T be a set of all pairs { i , j }  such that {i, j }  £ T if and only if firm i 
buys output of j  or j  buys output of i, i.e. T is a set of trade relations 
between the firms in the economy. It is assumed that T is stationary. 
To make the definition of T more straightforward, suppose that under 
some additional set of assumptions we have a Leontieff economy with 
an input-output matrix A. Then {i, j }  £ T iff the i, j-component of the 
Leontieff input-output matrix al;- ^  0, or /  0.
Summing up (and inevitably simplifying) the discussion on inter­
firm credit and privatization in the transitional economy in the previous 
section of the paper, I assume that there axe two types of firms in the 
economy: state-owned and private. A  state-owned firm is assumed to 
produce the output so far as it receives enough inputs, and supplies the 
output to other state firms irrespectively of whether the customer pays 
for the supplied commodities. However, it does not extend credit to a 
private firm. A  private firm always requires its customers to pay for the 




























































































to the suppliers of inputs, i.e. it pays the bills. Formally,
(3.1) Assumption Firms i and j  that trade with each other (that is, 
i , j  6 T ) create debt arrears against each other if and only if both firms 
are state- owned.
If a state firm i extends interfirm credit or does not pay for inputs, then 
the firm’s i net flow of funds need not to be equal to the economic profits 
II, in the following accountancy identity:
n, m,
£<?>,•+  n, =  £<7*p. (2)
j—l k=l
This is a situation when a state firm faces the “soft budget cons­
traint” due to the extension of interfirm credit. Assumption 3.1 implies 
that the net flow of funds equals the economic profits 11; if and only if 
one of the two conditions holds:
(a) firm i is a private firm;
(b) all firms that trade with firm i are private.
The difference between the net flows of funds and the profits of a 
state firm allows us to specify how the interfirm credit problem trans­
lates into the informational problem in the transitional economy. First, 
I make a distinction between public and private information in the model:
(3.2) Assumption A set T of trade relations in the economy and the 
net flows of funds for each firm in the economy are public information. 
A firm’s technology and output quantities are the firm’s private informa­
tion.
Assumptions (3.1) and (3.2) imply that although the net flows of funds 
of a state firm are public information, they do not correspond to its 
economic profits because a state firm can extend interfirm credit.
Following the discussion in the previous part of the paper I as­
sume that the government in the transitional economy wants to privatize 




























































































informational problem impedes, however, initial privatization through 
sales. When the economic value of a state firm is unknown, the govern­
ment cannot privatize the firm by selling it to private investors. The only 
possibility for privatizing such a firm is by giving it away to private ow­
ners through the mass privatization scheme. Such a method of divesture 
entails the loss of the government revenues, hence the government wants 
to limit its use. On the other hand, initial privatization reveals informa­
tion on the profitability of the remaining state firms. Hence, the initial 
give-away privatization clears the way to privatization through sales in 
the second period.
Without loss of generality, consider the simplest case described by 
the following assumption:
(3.3) Assumption (1) All firms in the economy are initially public.
(2) There are no restrictions on privatization of any firm in the economy.
(3) The government expects to incur a loss /' of the budget revenues 
from the give-away privatization of the firm i.
Under these conditions the government will want to choose some firms 
for initial privatization, such that their privatization reveals all the in­
formation about the profitability of the remaining public firms and the 
loss of budget revenues is minimized.
I start formalizing the government’s problem by defining a set of 
variables X  =  {x ; : i =  1 ... n } which describes an ownership structure 
in the economy. Variable xt- is equal to 1 if the government selects firm 
i for the give-away privatization program in the first period and x,- =  0 
otherwise. A  privatization plan l is defined then as an assignment of 
values -  1 for “private” and 0 for “state” -  to each variable x, in X.
Any privatization plan l should satisfy the following constraints: 
for any {«', j }  £ T, firm i should be private, or firm j  should be private, 
or both firms i and j  should be private. The optimal privatization plan 
denoted by l* should satisfy the constraints above and also minimize the 
total loss of the budget revenues by the government.






























































































The following economy has 3 firms and a set of trade relations T =  
{ {1 ,2 },  {2 ,3 }, {1 ,3 }}.  It is further assumed that the give-away privati­
zation of each firm in the first period leads to the equal loss of budget 
revenues normalized to 1, i.e. /'(1) =  1 and /'(0) =  Ofor t =  1 ... 3.
Define the set of variables X  =  {x\, x2, £3}  so that x,- =  1 if firm 
i is to be privatized and xt- =  0 otherwise, * =  1 ... 3. A solution of the 
government’s problem I* is an assignment of values 0 or 1 to the variables 
X i... X3  such that this assignment minimizes X j=1 x, and satisfies the set 
of constraints of the following form: for any { * , } }  6 F ,x , =  1 and xj =  0, 
or Xj — 1 and x,- =  0 (one of firms i and j  should be private), or x< =  1 
and Xj =  1 (both firms i and j  should be private).
The example above essentially defines the government’s objective -  the 
optimal sequencing of privatization —  in terms of a constraint satisfac­
tion optimization problem (CSOP).
A CSOP is completely defined by specifying a set of variables to­
gether with the variable domains, a set of constraints and an objective 
function. Let X  be a finite set of variables x, ordered by an arbitrary 
total order. Let d(x.) (the domain of X;) denote a set of values that the 
variable X; can take.
The set of all possible assignments of values to the variables in the 
ordered set X  =  {x t- : i =  1 ... n} is defined then as I W  <*(*<)■ Let 
a tuple u be one element of this set -  an assignment of values to the 
variables in X.
A constraint c is defined then by its scope s(c) C X , i.e. the va­
riables that it involves, and its extent e(c) C n*j€*(e) d(x,). A tuple u is 
said to satisfy a constraint c if RS(u,s(c) ) £ e(c), where RS(u,s(c)) 
denotes the restriction of u to a subset s(c) of X . For example, if 
u =  { 1,0, 1}  is an assignment of values to the ordered set of variables 
X  — {x j,  X2, X3}  and s(c) =  {x j,  X2}  is a subset of X,  then RS(u, s(c)) =  




























































































satisfies constraint c defined by its scope s(c) =  { x j ,x2}  and its extent 
e(c) =  { ( 0, 1), (1,0), (1, 1) } ,  while the assignment { 0,0, 1}  does not sa­
tisfy this constraint.
Finally, an objective function maps every tuple u that satisfies all 
constraints in a given problem (a consistent assignment) to some measure 
f ( u ) (/-value of u).
Returning to the privatization problem denote by L a set of all 
privatization plans l that satisfy the constraints of the following form: 
for any {i,  j }  G F (F is a set of trade relations in the economy) x, =  1, 
Xj -  0, or x, =  0, Xj =  1, or x,- =  1 and x;- =  1. The same set L  can 
be alternatively defined as a set of tuples /, such that each l satisfies 
the set of binary constraints C  =  {c }  with scopes s(c) — (x;,X j), where 
{ i , j }  G T and extents e(c) =  {(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )}.
In the context of the government’s objective, which is the minimi­
zation of the loss of budget revenues from privatization, a measure of 
optimality of a privatization plan l G L  is clearly defined as the sum 
of f " s  for each firm earmarked for give-away privatization by this pri­
vatization plan; that is /(/) =  ,eX f ' (RS( l ,Xi) ) ,  where /‘ ( 1) =  /' 
and /'(0) =  0. The optimal solution to the government’s privatization 
problem is the privatization plan /* G L  with the minimal /-value.
Summing up, the government’s objective is defined in terms of a 
CSOP as the following:
(3 .5) Definition The government’s privatization problem (CSOPp ) is 
defined as a constraint satisfaction optimization problem (X , C, /). X  
is a set of variables that indicate the form of ownership for each firm 
in the economy; each variable has a binary domain d(x;) =  {0 ,1 }. C 
is a set of binary constraints qj  with scopes s(ctJ) =  (x t,Xj), where 
{ « ,/ }  G T and extents e (c ,j) =  {(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )}. Then L is a set of 
assignments of values to the variables in X  such that each l G L  satisfies 
all the constraints in C. The objective function / : L  —> R+ is defined 
by / ( 0  =  Yjxiex f ' (RS ( l ,x ) ) ,  where / '(1) =  /' =  const, and / '(0) =  0. 




























































































A solution of the government’s problem defined by (3.5) specifies 
the optimal sequencing of privatization; it specifies which firms should 
be privatized immediately, in the first period, and which firms should 
be sold in the second period. The solution is defined by the set of trade 
relations in the economy and by the set of the expected losses of revenues 
because of give-away privatization in the first period.
However, finding a solution of the problem is a non-trivial task 
because of the computational time complexity of the algorithms that 
solve it. The following section describes the standard solution methods 
and identifies the complexity constraint faced by the government.
4. Solution Methods and Their Complexity
In example (3.4) it is easy to find a set of consistent assignments L  by the 
exhaustive enumeration of all the possible assignments of values to the 
variables and checking which assignments satisfy the set of constraints C. 
After doing this, a CSOP solution -  a consistent assignment with the mi­
nimal value of the objective function -can be found by direct comparison 
of /- values. Such a solution method is called the “generate-and-test” 
algorithm.
It is easy to see that the “generate-and-test” algorithm needs to 
process 2" (n =  |A|) candidate solutions before it finds a CSOPp so­
lution. In the terminology of computer science such algorithm is said 
to have exponential time complexity2. Clearly, for small problems time 
complexity of the algorithm does not matter a lot. However, the gover­
nment’s optimal sequencing of privatization problem includes thousands
2 More precisely, here and further down I use the term “ time complexity” to refer 
to the worst case computational time of an algorithm. Computational time is mea­
sured in some simple computer operations, e.g. an operation that compares two sets 
of numbers and returns “true” if they axe identical and “false” otherwise. Such a 
simple operation could be in turn easily decomposed into some number of elementary 
computer operations. Worst case time complexity is an upper bound of the computa­
tional time of an algorithm. Worst case time complexity is a sufficiently informative 




























































































of variables as was suggested in the second section of the paper. Thus 
it is intuitively clear that the government faces a much more difficult 
decision-making problem than those considered in example (3.4).
The usual method for measuring the complexity of a problem is to 
look at the algorithm that solves this problem and see whether it finds a 
solution in a reasonable amount of time (Gibbons (1985)). If there exists 
an algorithm that solves a problem in the number of computational steps 
polynomial in the problem size (polynomial time algorithm or efficient 
algorithm) then this problem is tractable in general. A difference between 
polynomial and exponential time algorithm is illustrated by the following 
table (Gibbons (1985)), which lists the numbers of computational steps 
that algorithms with different time complexities need to perform to solve 
problems of the given size:
Time Complexity Problem Size
2 8 128 1024
n 2 23 27 210
n2 22 26 214 220
2" 22 28 2128 21024
that 210 steps/second R X
Oio•n 222 steps/hour
i  1.3 x 226 steps/day
s 0.9 x 235 steps/year
s 0.7 x 242 steps/century.
That is, the “generate-and-test” algorithm would solve, for exam­
ple, a CSOPp  with 1,000 variables for at least 2958 centuries if it can 
process 1,024 computational steps per second. Moreover, an exponential 
time algorithm may be so inefficient that, even with computational speed 
vastly increased, it would not be possible to solve significantly bigger pro­
blems. For example, if Np is the size of the largest problem solvable by 
an algorithm with polynomial time complexity n2, then using 210 higher 
computational speed will allow to solve the problem of the maximal size 
32Np. An analogous result for an algorithm with exponential time com­





























































































However, the performance of the “generate-and-test” algorithm may 
be improved if the generation of an assignment of values is combined with 
the verification of constraints. This is the basic principle of a standard 
algorithm used for solving a CSOP -  the pure backtracking (PB ) algo­
rithm.
The key concept needed to describe the PB is the notion of a search 
space. Informally, a search space is a concise way of characterizing all 
the assignments of values to the variables in a problem. A  search space 
generated by an ordered set of variables X  =  {x i, x2, ... , x „ } is a tree- 
structured graph. The children of the root of the graph are elements 
of d(xi )  called first-level nodes. The children of any z-th level node 
(1 <  i <  n — 1) are elements of d(xt+i). Level n nodes are leaves, i.e. 
they have no children. A path from the root to a leaf is a complete 
assignment of values to all the variables. A path from the root to an 
internal node at level i is a partial assignment up to the level i.
Note that all possible paths from the root to the leaves of a search 
space are generated by the “generate-and-test” procedure first and then 
tested for constraint violations. In contrast to “the generate-and-test” 
the PB does not generate all variable assignments first; instead, it com­
bines finding of a complete assignment with the testing for a violation of 
constraints. Thus assignments that violate the constraints may be ruled 
out at the early stages of the search for a solution.
The PB algorithm starts from X\ and traverses the search space 
depth first creating a consistent partial assignment of values to the va­
riables. The PB checks relevant constraints each time when it moves from 
level i to level i +  1 of the search space. The PB algorithm backtracks to 
the previous level when it cannot extend the assignment to include the 
next variable because of the violation of the constraint.
When the PB algorithm finds a complete consistent assignment of 
values it also backtracks and starts searching for another assignment. 
The PB algorithm keeps track of the visited nodes of the search space by 
creating a list of visited nodes for each level of the search space. When 
the PB backtracks from level i to level i — 1 of the search space it clears 




























































































when the list of visited nodes for the level 1 contains all the nodes at this 
level. The following example illustrates how the PB algorithm works3.
(4.1) Example
Consider the problem defined in (3.4). The following table illustrates 
step-by-step how the PB algorithm finds a set of all consistent assi­
gnments4.
step assignment l s(c)
1 1 * *
2 1 1 * ( * 1, * 2)
3 1 1 1 (X!,X3), (x2,X3)
4 1 1 0 (x1; x3), (x2,x3)
5 1 0 * ( * 1, * 2)
6 1 0 1 (x i , x3), (x2, x3)
7 1 0 * (x i,x 3),(x2,x3)
8 0 * *
9 0 1 * (x i,x 2)
10 0 1 1 (x i,x 3),(x2,x3)
The set of assignments that satisfy all the constraints is {(1 ,1 ,1 ), (1,1,0), 
(1,0, 1), (0, 1, 1) } ;  the subset of solutions that satisfy the government’s 
optimality criteria is { ( 1, 1,0), (1,0, 1), (1,0, 1) } ,  which is the solution 
set of the CSOPp.
In general, the PB algorithm may need to backtrack an exponential num­
ber of times before creating a complete consistent assignment5. However, 
in example (4.1) above the PB could always extend a consistent assi­
gnment of values to include the next variable. In other words the PB 
traversed the search space without backtracking. This is not a coinci­
dence, backtrack-free performance of the PB hinges upon a special pro­
perty of the CSOPp. Since e(c) =  {(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )}, Vc £ C, the 
assignment of value 1 to any variable x, 6 X  is compatible with any
3For a more formal definition of PB see Tsang(1993).
4* is an empty assignment.
5 For an extensive discussion on the sources of backtracking and possible ways to 




























































































value assigned to another variable xj E X.  Hence, any partial consistent 
assignment of values can be extended to include an additional variable 
labelled by 1 without violating any constraints.
It is easy to see then that the BP algorithm creates a consistent 
assignment of values to all variables x (assignment l) in computational 
time which is linear in the size of the problem |.Y|. In other words, the 
BP is an efficient method to find a single consistent assignment l. The 
source of inefficiency of the PB is in the second type of backtracking -  
backtracking after finding a complete consistent assignment of values. 
The number of such assignments and hence the number of times that the 
PB algorithm backtracks is bounded by an exponent.
(4.2) Proposition The worst case time complexity of finding a so­
lution r  of a CSOPp by the BP algorithm is nr2", where n =  |X| is the 
number of variables and r =  \C\ is the number of constraints.
Proof: Finding an assignment l requires checking at most r constraints 
at each level of the search space (because the PB does not backtrack in 
this case), in total nr constraint checks. However, in the worst case the 
PB needs to generate 2" assignments before it finds an optimal one -  a 
CSOPp solution l*. Q.E.D.
In fact, none of the existent computer algorithms can find & CSOPp 
solution in polynomial time. Existence of a polynomial time (efficient) 
algorithm should not be taken for granted for every problem. There 
exists a broad class of problems -  the NP-complete problems -  which 
are widely believed to be not tractable in general because no efficient 
algorithm is known for any member of this class. Moreover, each NP- 
complete problem can be transformed into any other problem of the same 
class, hence if an efficient algorithm was known for any of these problems, 
then such an algorithm would exist for any one of the others.
It could be proved that the government’s problem CSOPp is an 
NP-complete problem6. It means that the government’s ability to make
6In mathematical terms CSOPp is technically identical to the “minimal vertex 




























































































the optimal decision is restricted by the complexity of the problem, even 
though the government knows the solution method. For the large pro­
blem the complexity constraint is binding; the government is unable to 
set up an optimal privatization plan.
However, the government can set up a privatization plan l that 
does not necessarily satisfy the optimality criteria relatively easily; the 
complexity of finding a solution is not a problem for the government 
in this case7. However, such a privatization program would be biased 
towards give-away privatization and would lead to the excessive loss of 
government’s revenues. Privatization in the first period would reveal all 
the information about the value of the firms but only few or none of the 
firms would remain for privatization through sales in the second period.
This result seems to be quite intuitive because the time and effort 
that the government can allocate to solve a given problem is limited 
in general and especially limited in the transitional economy, where the 
number of pressing economic problems is large. Hence it is reasonable 
to say that even if there exists a solution method to the government’s 
problem it may not be useful in practical terms because the government 
cannot simultaneously consider all the different relevant aspects of the 
problem.
Summing up, existing solution methods do not guarantee that a 
large problem, such as the optimal sequencing of privatization problem, 
can be solved in practical terms because the complexity of the algorithm 
may be prohibitive. In terms of government decision-making, it means 
that in general the government cannot take for granted that it is able to 
find the optimal plan for privatization by establishing a set of criteria that 
such plan should satisfy and setting up an objective. The multiplicity of 
the relevant constraints implies that it might be prohibitively difficult for
(1985)). Moreover, a CSOP is an NP-complete problem in general (Tsang (1993)).
7 On the other hand, this result is rather unstable with respect to the set of cons­
traints that the government’s privatization plan needs to satisfy. If, for example, e(c) 
were modified for some c € C to become some subset of {(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )}, then fin­
ding an assignment that satisfies all the constraints become an NP-complete problem 




























































































the government to find a privatization plan that satisfies all the criteria 
and optimizes the government’s objective -  the complexity constraint is 
binding. Overcoming the complexity constraint requires the organization 
of the solution procedure along the lines that I will specify next.
5. Overcoming Complexity Constraints
The complexity constraint is binding for a large problem. However, a re­
latively small problem can be solved even by an inefficient algorithm with 
exponential time complexity. This consideration points towards problem 
decomposition which may help to overcome the complexity constraint. 
The idea of dividing a large problem into several smaller problem is 
straightforward but its realization may be technically involved in a gene­
ral case. Unless different parts of the original problem are completely in­
dependent from each other there will be links between the sub-problems.
In general, we should be able to construct a solution of the whole 
problem from the sub-problem solutions. This requirement leads to the 
following two considerations. First, sub-problem solutions should be 
compatible with each other, second, each individual solution should be 
expandable to the solution of the whole problem. The compatibility of 
the solutions gives rise to constraints between the sub-problems of the 
following form: if two sub-problems share some common variables then 
these variables should be assigned identical values in each of the two sub­
problems. These constraints insure that the sets of sub-problem solutions 
are compatible. For a sub-problem solution to be also expandable it is 
necessary that it does not violate any constraints in the rest of the pro­
blem. Hence every sub-problem should contain all the constraints whose 
scopes include the variables in the sub-problem.
The above principals that insure that the problem solution can be 
obtained from sub-problem solutions are realized in a hinge decompo­
sition of the problem (Gyssens et al. (1994)). A  hinge decomposition 
explores the structure of the problem; the problem constraints that de­




























































































form a number of sub-problems. To insure compatibility of sub-problem 
solutions a hinge decomposition defines a set of constraints between the 
sub-problems -  a set of “compatibility” constraints.
A hinge decomposition has an additional desirable property which 
is the special regular structure of the set of “compatibility” constraints. 
This property allows to find a problem solution relatively fast after all 
the sub-problems are solved. Thus the overall tractability of the problem 
will depend rather on the size of the largest sub-problem than on the size 
of the problem itself.
The hinge-decomposition techniques explore the problem structure. 
In the context of the government’s problem, we do not usually expect that 
a firm has trade relations with every other firm in the economy. Because 
of physical distances or product specialization, firms form subgroups, 
such that a firm trades intensively with other firms within a subgroup, 
but relatively little outside. For example, the local food processing indu­
stry, retail and wholesale trade firms, services and utilities may form a 
closely related subgroup. Another intensively trading subgroup may, for 
example, be firms in the aerospace industry, which probably have little 
trade with food-processing firms. Such closely related groups of firms are 
best suited to define sub- problems with the minimal interactions with 
the others.
Every CSOP has an underlying structure called a CSOP graph 
defined by the scopes of the problem’s constraints. A graph of a CSO P  =  
( X , C , f )  is a graph G — (X ,S )  with the set of nodes X  and the set of 
edges S =  (s (c ) : c £ C}. Obviously the graph of a CSOPp  has a set of 
edges which is identical to the set of trade relations in the economy.
A closely related group of variables and constraints defined for these 
variables corresponds to a connected sub-graph with the set of edges 
S{ C S: for any two edges s0 and sm in 5,- there exists a sequence of 
edges s0, Si,..,sm_ i, *'m contained in 5;. Additionally, Si C S -  Sj is 
called connected with respect to Sj C S if for any two edges so and sm 
in Si there exists a sequence of edges s0, si,..,sm_1,sm in Si, such that 
Si fl Sj.+1 £ U Sj for i =  k, ..., m — 1. The maximal connected subsets of 




























































































A hinge of a graph is a connected subset of edges, such that each 
connected (with respect to this subset) component of the graph intersects 
it within one of its edges. Formally:
(5.1) Definition [Gyssens et al. (1994)] Let G =  (X, S) be a connected 
graph and let h be either S or connected proper subset of S, containing 
at least two edges. Let H i , . . . ,  Hm be connected components of S — h 
with respect to h. Then h is called a hinge if for every i =  1, . . .  ,m there 
exists an edge Si G h such that (U //,) D (U h) C s,. A hinge that does 
not contain other hinges is called a minimal hinge.
The crucial distinction between a hinge and any other subset of 
edges is that the variables shared by h and a connected component H, 
belong to the separating edge s; in h. Hence “interaction” links between 
hinges are limited in this sense.
Since a hinge is just a subset of constraints of the problem it is 
possible to define a set of consistent assignments of values to the variables 
contained in a hinge h,-. This set of assignments is denoted by L,. Each 
set Li can be found by the P B  algorithm providing that the size of 
the hinge is small enough so that the problem is tractable even for an 
inefficient algorithm. The task of finding a set of consistent assignments 
for a hinge defines a sub-problem whose solution is the set L;.
To insure compatibility of sub-problem solution sets define a set 
of constraints of the following form: variables x in a constraint shared 
by two different hinges should be assigned the same values in both hin­
ges. A  hinge decomposition is defined thus by the set of hinges and the 
set of such “compatibility” constraints. A hinge decomposition is cha­
racterized by its graph -  a hinge tree. A set of nodes of a hinge tree 
corresponds to the set of hinges and a set of edges corresponds to the set 
of “compatibility” constraints. Gyssens et. al. (1994) present an algo­
rithm that computes a tree-structured minimal hinge decomposition of 
a graph G =  (X , S) (hinge tree) in at most |X||5|2 =  nr2 computational 
time.




























































































(5.2) Definition [Gyssens et al. (1994)] Let G =  (A", 5 ) be a graph. 
A hinge decomposition of G is a tree HT — (X/,, A)  with a set of nodes 
Xh =  {/ i} and a set of labeled arks A =  {(hi, hj;label(hi, hj)), such that:
(1) tree nodes h E A/, are minimal hinges of G,
(2) each edge in S is contained in at least one tree node,
(3) two adjacent tree nodes (hi and hj) share precisely one edge of S 
which is also the label of their connecting arc (label(hi,hj)), and their 
shared vertices are precisely the members of this edge,
(4) the vertices of A  shared by two tree nodes are entirely contained 
within each node on their connecting path.
The following example provides an illustration of a hinge-tree de­
composition of a CSOP.
(5.3) Example
Let C SO P  =  (A , C, f )  be given by A  =  {x 4, . . . ,  x5); d(x() =  {0 ,1} ,  for 
i =  1 ,...,5  ; C  =  {c !, . . .c # },  where s(cj) =  sx =  (x : ,x2), s2 =  ( * 2,*s), 
s3  =  ( * i , * 3), s4 =  ( * 3, * 4), s5 =  ( * 3,2:5), s6 =  (x4,x s), and e(cj) =
{(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )} for j  =  1.......6; /(/) =  £?=i RS( l ,Xi) for all / G L
where L  is a set of assignments that satisfy all the constraints in C.
A graph of the problem is defined as G =  (A , 5), where S — {s, : 
i =  1 . . .5 }.  A  hinge tree H T  =  (Xh,A)  decomposition of the graph 
G — (X ,S )  is defined then as the following: A/, =  {hi ,h 2 ,h3} , where 
h 1 =  { 51,^2, 33} ,  /i2 =  { « 3,^5} ,  h3 =  {s 4,s5,s6}, and A =  {(h\, /i2; S3) , 
(/i2, h3; S5) } .
Given its hinge decomposition any CSOP  can be transformed into 
a dual tree-structured problem -  C SO P ' . A dual problem is a constraint 
satisfaction optimization problem with the set of variables defined for 
minimal hinges and a set of constraints defined for all arcs that connect 
the hinges. Each hinge i defines a variable hi with the set of values L,, 
i.e. the domain of /i, d(/t;) =  Each pair of adjacent hinges defines 




























































































ges that satisfy a set of “compatibility” constraints is identical to the 
set of assignments L  in the original problem -  C SO P  because we do 
not add, delete, or modify any constraint or variable in the original pro­
blem transforming it into the dual problem. Hence the objective function 
/ : L —* R+ remains the same for the dual problem. Summing up:
(5.4) Definition Let H T  =  (Xh, A)  be a decomposition of G =  (X , 5) 
of a CSO P  =  (X , C , f ). A dual tree-structured problem is defined as 
CSOP'  =  (X h ,C ' , f ), where Xh is a set of minimal hinges hi of the 
hinge tree; the domain of a variable h, £ Xh is a set of solutions of the 
sub-problem defined for the minimal hinge hi, i.e. d(ht) — Li. C' is 
a set of binary constraints d defined by the scope s{d) C Xh, and ex­
tent e(c') =  {(a , b) : a 6 d'(/i,),6 £ d(hj), RS(a,x) — RS(b,x) for each 
x £ label(hi,hj)}, i.e. variables x in the shared constraint should be 
assigned the same values in both adjacent hinges. An objective function 
/ : L —► R+ is defined as an objective function in the original problem.
Returning to example (5.3) define a dual optimization problem 
using hinge-tree decomposition.
(5.5 ) Example (5.3 continued)
For each of the minimal hinges in the hinge-tree decomposition find a 
set of assignments of values to the variables contained in the hinge that 
satisfy all the constraints that form the hinge. For example, hinge ĥ  is 
formed by the set of constraints Chi — {c i, c2, c3}  and it contains the set 
of variables Xh\ =  s(ci) U s(c2) U s(c3) =  {x i,  X2, 2̂3}- The set of assi­
gnments of values to the set of variables { r i , £2, 2:3}  that satisfy the set 
of constraints {ci,C2 ,c3} is the following:
assignments: ai C*2 «3 «4
Xi 1 0 1 1
x-i 1 1 0 1
x3 1 1 1 0
The set of consistent assignments {a ! i , . . . ,a 4}  can be found either by 




























































































define analogously the sets of consistent assignments {p i , . .. ,p3} and 
{ y j , ... ,74}  for hinges h2 and ha respectively:
assignments: Pi P2 Pi Pi Pi
27 1 0 0 1 1
x3 1 1 1 1 0
*5 1 1 0 0 1
assignments: 7i 72 73 74
x3 1 0 1 1
X4 1 1 0 1
Z5 1 1 1 0
It is possible to define now a set of variables for the dual pro­
blem ({hi, h2, /13} )  with the following domains: d(hi) =  { 07, . . . ,  <24}, 
d(h2) — {P\,. ■ ■ ,Ps} and d(h3) — { 74, . . .  ,74}. The set of “compatibili­
ty” constraints of the dual problem requires that shared variables x are 
assigned the same values in both adjacent hinges. For example, hinges hi 
and ho share two variables: xx and 27; assignments 07 and Pi are compa­
tible because both assign 1 to 27 and 1 to x3 while assignments 07 and p2 
are not compatible because 27 is assigned 1 by 07 and 0 by p2. In other 
words, there is a constraint c\ with the scope (hi, h2) such that the pair 
(07, Pi) belongs to the extent of this constraint. The whole set of cons­
traints for the dual problem (C1) is defined analogously: C' =  { dx, c'2}, 
s(cj) =  (hx,h2) , s(d2) =  (h2,h3),
e(c'i) — { ( a i>Pi), ((*i,Pi), (0:2, P2), (^2,Pi), («3, Pi), (ai, Pi), K ,A > ) }  
e(c2) =  {(Pi, 7l). (Pi, 73), (P2, l l ) ,  (P2, 73), (Pi, l i ) ,  (Pi, 74), (^5,72) }
Finally, the objective function is defined as before: f ( l )  — X)f=] RS(l,Xi).
Summing up, the dual tree-structured problem CSOP'  is defined 
by the triple (Xh ,C ' , f )  specified above.
Let CSOP'p be a dual problem defined for CSOPp. The dual 




























































































as the original problem; first we apply the PB algorithm to find a set 
of assignments L  and, second, we find an optimal assignment /' € L by 
the direct comparison of till the assignments in L. However, this would 
not be efficient because we did not use the acyclic structure of the dual 
problem. Remember that the source of inefficiency of the BP algorithm 
was identified as being in the exhaustive enumeration of all sub-optimal 
assignments. The acyclic structure of the dual problem can be used to 
avoid such an enumeration and thus improve the performance of the PB 
algorithm in solving the dual problem. The acyclic structure of the set 
of constrains allows us to apply the principle of dynamic programming 
to rule out suboptimal assignments before actually finding them.
However, to apply the principle of dynamic programming we should 
be able to find /-values of partial assignments. The necessary step then 
is to make sure that the /-value of a problem solution I f f  is equal to 
the sum of /-values of the sub-problems’ solutions, i.e. we need to find 
a function ip' defined on each hinge (variable) of the dual problem such 
that
m =  £  * 4(fc )=  £ / W (/ ,x ) )  (3)
hiCXu x£X
We get the necessary result if ip' is defined on some subset of varia­
bles x contained in a hinge hi, such that these subsets form a partition 
of X s. More precisely, define
n h i ) =  £  f'(RS(l,x)) (4)
x£domi
where
donii =  {x  : x £ ((J  hi — U  hj) and hj is a parent of ft,}
A set {donii} can be created by a simple algorithm that compares 
each variable x in hi with each variable in the parent node hj. If the 8
8Note that otherwise the objective function would be defined as
/(/)= £  n h i ) = Y i aif i{RS{l,x)),
ft, ex» xex




























































































number of variables x contained in the largest minimal hinge of the H T  
is bounded by m and the number of minimal hinges in the H T  is bounded 
by |Xfc|, then the time complexity of the algorithm is bounded by m?\Xh\ 
computational steps.
The next proposition shows that the set of dorrii forms a partition
of X.
(5.6) Proposition {dorrii : ht G A ),} forms a partition of X.
Proof: To complete the proof it is necessary to show that the following 
two conditions are satisfied:
(J dorrii =  X  and (5)
1
dorrii H dorrij =  0, Vh;, hj G Xh, hi ^  hj (6)
Suppose the first condition (5) does not hold. If there exists x such 
that x dorrii,\/hi G Xh then it is either the case that x ^ (J h,, Vh,- G Xh, 
which is impossible by the second property of the HT, or x G U hj where 
hj is the parent node of hi V/i; G Xh which is impossible because the root 
of the HT has no parents.
To establish the second condition it is sufficient to show that if 
x G dorrii then x £ dorrij. Suppose x G dorrij, then by the fourth pro­
perty of the HT x should belong to all nodes of the HT on the path that 
connects hi and hj. Any such path includes the parent node of hi in the 
HT, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Returning to the problem specified by (5.3) and (5.5) define / : 
L —+ R+ as an additively-separable function.
(5.7) Example (5.3 continued)
Define dorri3 =  {£ 4} ,  dom-i =  {£ 5} ,  dom\ =  { x\,x^,x3} .  Now we can 
define functions ip' on dorrii for each hinge: ip'(hi) =  Ŷ xedom, x ))
for i =  1,2,3. The {dorrii} forms a partition of X  hence





























































































A tree-structured dual problem with additively-separable objective 
function can be solved by an efficient algorithm which is explained in 
appendix A. The main idea of the algorithm is the following: first, define 
starting from the leaves of the hinge tree an optimal value function (al­
gorithm (A .2)), second, use the modified PB algorithm (algorithm(A.5)) 
to create an optimal assignment of values (a CSOP solution). The de­
tailed description of the algorithms is presented in the appendix and the 
following example illustrates the main steps of the solution procedure.
(5.8) Example (5.5 continued)
Consider the dual problem C SO P' defined in (5.5) with the objective 
function / defined in (5.7). The problem has a simple tree-structured 
graph with three nodes and two arks. In order to identify which node 
is the root of the tree it is necessary to define a total order on the set 
of nodes such that each node has at most one parent node (a width-one 
order which is formally defined in appendix A ). Let h3  be a node of the 
highest order and hi be a node of the lowest order. Node hi is then a 
root of the tree and h3  is a leaf.
For leaf h3 define the values of optimal value function v for each 
element in the domain of h3 by setting them equal to their t/j-values (step 
1 of algorithm A.2 in appendix A):





For node h2  the values of optimal value function v are defined as 
the sum of the i/’-value of an assignment to h2 and the u-value of the best 
assignment to h3 which is compatible with the given assignment to h2 
(step k of algorithm (A.2)). For example, Pi 6 d(h2) is compatible both 




























































































function takes the value 1 for 71 and 0 for 73: « ( 71) =  1 and 11(73) =  0. 
The ip-value of f3\ is 1. Hence v{(5\) =  rp(Pi) +  « ( 73) =  1. The rest of the 
v-values for the elements of d(h2) (assignments to h2) is defined in the
same way:
h i n p p v(P i)
P i 1 1
P2 1 1
p 3 0 1
P i 0 1
p 5 1 2
The values of the optimal value function for hi are defined ana­
logously using v-values for h2 and ^-values for hi (step k of algorithm
(A-2)):
h i at ¥ ( ( * i) v(oti)




After defining the optimal value function we can use it to find an op­
timal solution without enumerating all possible sub-optimal assignments 
(algorithm (A.5)). We start from the root of the tree (h i) and select an 
assignment to the root (a,- £ d(hi)) which has an optimal «-value (step 
1 of algorithm (A .5)). We proceed to the children of the root and find 
a set of assignments which are consistent with the optimal assignment 
to the root; among them we select one with the optimal «-value (step k 
of algorithm (A.5)). We repeat this step until each node (variable) hi 
is assigned an optimal value. Such an assignment is a solution of the 
optimization problem (both C SO P' and C SO P).
For example, take cr2 £ d(h j )  which has the minimal v-value among 
(a , : i — 1 ... 4}; a2  is compatible with P2 and /?3 in d(h2). Take /32 which 
has the minimal «-value among {/?2,/?3} 9; P2  is compatible with 71 and




























































































73 in d(h.3 ). In the set { 71, 73}  73 has the minimal v-value hence ft3 is as­
signed 73. The complete assignment ( « 2, ̂ 2,73) is a solution of the dual 
problem; the corresponding solution of the C SO P  in example (5.3) is the 
assignment of values (0, 1, 1,0, 1) to the tuple of variables ( i j  ... x5)10.
Summing up, it is shown that a C SO P  with an arbitrary graph 
structure can be transformed into an equivalent tree-structured CSOP'. 
The transformation involves finding a hinge-tree decomposition of a CSO P  
graph, finding all consistent assignments of values in the sub-problems 
associated with each minimum hinge in the hinge tree and formulating 
the dual tree-structured problem C SO P1, using the sub-problem soluti­
ons. After doing this C SO P' is solved by algorithms (A .2) and (A .5). 
Is this method significantly better for solving the government’s problem 
than a simple (unaided) BP algorithm?
The next proposition estimates the efficiency of the method.
(5.9) Proposition The worst case time complexity of finding a solu­
tion of CSOPp using the problem-decomposition techniques is bounded 
by nr2-f mr22m-|- m2 r+  r (2m +  2), where n — |X| is the number of va­
riables, r =  |C| is the number of constraints in the original problem and 
m is the number of variables in the largest minimal hinge of a HT. 
Proof: The total computational time consists of the cost of formula­
ting the dual problem (CSOP'p) and of the cost of solving it. The cost 
of formulating a dual problem is composed from three components: fin­
ding a HT decomposition of the graph G, finding sets L, defined for each 
minimal hinge ft,-, and finally finding a partition of the variables {dom,}.
The cost of finding a HT decomposition of the graph G =  (X , S) 
is bounded by |X||S|2 — nr2, where n =  |X| and r =  |S| =  |C| (Gyssens 
et al. (1994)).
The cost of finding one set L; is bounded by | (J ft;| |fti|2^ U I (Pro­
position (4.2)), where | (J fti| and |ft,| are the number of variables and the
10The complete set of CSOP' solutions is: { ( « 2, /b> 73), («21 f t ,  74),
( « 3, /b,73), ( « 3,(84,74) } ;  these establish solutions of the original problem




























































































number of constraints in the hinge h, respectively. Let m be the number 
of variables in the largest minimal hinge. Since the number of minimal 
hinges in the HT and the number of constraints in the largest hinge 
are both bounded by the number of constraints in the original problem 
r =  |C|, the cost of finding all sets L; is bounded by r2m2m.
Finally, the cost of defining a partition {dom ,} is bounded by m2r, 
rri and r defined as before.
By proposition (A .8) the cost of finding a solution of a tree-structured 
C SO P  is bounded by n'(k' +  2), where k' is the size of the largest do­
main and n' is the number of variables in the dual problem. For the dual 
problem CSOP'p the size of the largest domain k' will be equal to the 
size of the largest set L{ and it is bounded by 2m, where m is defined as 
before and 2 is the size of domains d(x). The number of variables in the 
dual problem equals to the number of minimal hinges in the HT and it is 
bounded by r. Hence the cost of finding a solution to the dual problem 
is bounded by r (2m +  2).
Overall, the total cost of solving CSOPp using the decomposition 
method is bounded by the sum of all the components: nr2+  mr22m-|- 
m2r +  r(2m +  2). Q.E.D.
The time complexity of finding a H T  of the graph and solving the 
dual problem CSO P' is bounded by a polynomial. However, finding a 
set of assignments defined for the minimal hinge is bounded by expo­
nential time, hence it is the most “expensive” part of the algorithm. In 
other words, the leading term in the cost expression derived in propo­
sition (5.9) above is 2m. The leading term in the time cost expression 
is most informative about the time complexity of an algorithm for large 
inputs. “It is the rate of growth of the running time that really interests 
us. We therefore consider only the leading term of a formula since the 
lower order terms are relatively insignificant for large [input size]. We 
also ignore the leading term’s constant coefficient, since constant factors 
are less significant than the rate of growth in determining computational 
efficiency for large inputs” (Cormen et al. (1990 p.10)). Hence, the over­




























































































techniques can be roughly measured by the size of the largest minimal 
hinge in the H T  which is uniquely defined for each graph (Gyssens et 
al.(1994)).
The decomposition of the privatization problem along the lines spe­
cified above helps to overcome the complexity constraints unless the size 
of the largest minimal hinge is equal to the size of the whole problem. 
Remember that by proposition (4.2) the cost of finding a CSOPp solu­
tion by the PB algorithm is roughly measured by the leading term of 
the time expression 2". When the size of the largest sub-problem (m) 
is less than the size of the whole problem (n) problem-decomposition 
techniques provide a clear efficiency gain.
6. Problem Decomposition and an Efficient 
Administrative Structure
Countries in transition that implemented mass privatization programs 
had to set up administrative organizations responsible for making pri­
vatization decisions. Although the details of the administrative orga­
nizations differ from country to country, there is a common feature in 
their structure -  the decentralization of decision-making. Given that the 
problem decomposition helps to overcome the complexity of the privati­
zation problem the decentralization of the administrative structure may 
be rationalized as a method that improves administrative efficiency.
In the same way as an algorithm uses limited computational re­
sources to solve CSOPp , an administrative organization utilizes limited 
administrative resources to produce a required output -  administrative 
decisions. The efficiency of an algorithm and administrative efficiency 
both matter because resources that they utilize are limited. While an 
inefficient algorithm makes the computational cost of solving a problem 
prohibitive, inefficient bureaucracy is unable to make an administrative 
decision.
In the context of the privatization problem an efficient administra­




























































































sequencing of privatization (a CSOPp solution). It was shown that fin­
ding the optimal sequencing of privatization is a difficult decision-making 
task; the methods which can solve it have exponential time complexity. 
However, the complexity may be reduced if we divide the whole task into 
severed sub-problems.
The result on the efficiency of the decomposition of the problem is 
close to the following argument made by Herbert Simon with respect to 
decision-making in organizations: “The division of labor is quite as im­
portant in organizing decision-making as in organizing production, but 
what is being divided is different in the two cases. From the informa­
tion processing point of view, division of labor means factoring the total 
system of decisions that need to be made into relatively independent sub­
systems, each one of which can be designed with only minimal concern 
for its interactions with the others. The division is necessary because the 
processors that are available to organizations whether humans or com­
puters are very limited in their processing capacity in comparison with 
the magnitude of decision problems that organizations face. The num­
ber of alternatives that can be considered, the intricacy of the chains 
of consequences that can be traced -  all these are severely restricted by 
the limited capacities of the available processors” Simon (1976,p.293). 
Following Simon’s advice we have found a solution method that divi­
des the whole problem into relatively independent sub-problems -  the 
hinge-decomposition method.
How can we characterize the solution method in organizational 
terms? In general, an administrative structure specifies which admi­
nistrative units are responsible for making given decisions and how the 
information (the initial input information and the information about de­
cisions already taken) passes between different units (Simon 1976). We 
can also characterize the structure of a solution method in the same 
terms. Hence we can specify a mapping from a solution method (algo­
rithm) to an administrative structure of an organization responsible for 
a decision-making task.
The decision about the optimal sequencing of privatization in the 




























































































individual firms. The initial input information for the privatization pro­
blem corresponds to the set T of trade relations in the economy and the 
set { / ' }  of the expected losses of revenues due to give-away privatization. 
Hence the structure of an administrative organization responsible for pri­
vatization is characterized by three factors: the authority which makes a 
decision about the privatization of individual firm, the information which 
is used to make this decision and further application of the decisions.
The centralized administrative structure thus is characterized as 
one administrative unit that processes all the individual decisions itself 
using the whole set of input information. We have seen that this corre­
sponds (with obvious simplifications) to the manner in which the simple 
PB and the “generate-and-test” algorithms operate. On the other hand, 
considering the hinge-decomposition method we can identify separate 
administrative units with individual hinges. Each unit makes decisions 
about the problem variables contained in the hinge using only the infor­
mation that concerns these variables (the set of constraints that forms 
the hinge). However, the division of the decision-making tasks and the 
coordination of individual units requires a central administrative autho­
rity.
The existence of a central administrative unit implies some degree 
of centralization of decision-making but it is not equivalent to the centra­
lized administrative structure. The important thing is that the detailed 
information, the information about domains of the variables and extents 
of the constraints, is stored and processed locally. Only the information 
about the structure of the problem and sub-problem solutions has to be 
communicated to the center.
The efficiency gain from applying the hinge-decomposition solu­
tion method corresponds then to the efficiency gain from the decentra­
lization of the administrative organization. Thus we can rationalize a 
decentralized administrative structure from the point of view of algorith­
mic efficiency. The efficient administrative structure is determined by a 
hinge-tree decomposition of the problem which depends, in turn, on the 
structure of trade relations in the economy. Since a hinge-tree decom­




























































































correspondence between the administrative structure arid the structure 
of trade relations. However, the size of the largest sub-problem (the size 
of the largest hinge in a hinge-tree decomposition) is uniquely defined for 
a given problem. Hence we can predict the size of the largest administra­
tive unit in the efficient administrative organization given the structure 
of the problem.
Summing up, there exists a direct link between the efficiency of solu­
tion methods and the efficient organization of the government’s decision­
making process. The structure of the decision-making process determi­
nes then the efficient administrative structure. We can predict in the 
framework of the model that the efficient structure of the administrative 
organization responsible for privatization is a decentralized one.
7. Extensions
The results of the paper so far have been developed in the extremely 
simplified framework defined by assumptions (3.1) and (3.2), which re­
strict the model to the binary constraints with the special extent type 
e(c) =  {(0 ,1 ), (1,0), (1 ,1 )}. This is clearly a simplification and real-life 
governments may need to take into account many more considerations 
when designing the optimal reform plan. For example, the privatization 
of some firms may not be politically feasible unless a large part of the 
shares goes to the enterprise insiders (political constraints, specified and 
studied by Boycko et al.(1994)), or the government may worry about 
monopolistic behavior and possible collusion if privatization creates ex­
cessively concentrated ownership.
We can show that additional considerations may be captured in 
the CSOP framework by a more detailed specification of the variable do­
mains and a more general specification of the constraints. Hence a more 
general problem can be specified in the framework of the same mathema­
tical model. What implications will it have for the efficiency of solution 
methods? This section briefly presents several possible extensions and 




























































































sufficiently robust with respect to modifications of the basic model.
The literature on privatization in Eastern Europe often stresses 
the “political constraints” that any successful privatization plan should 
meet. First, some enterprises may be considered “too big to fail” , hence 
the government may want to postpone their privatization. This type 
of constraint is easily modeled in the CSOP framework by assigning a 
very large loss value /' to the relevant variable xt, or, alternatively, by 
introducing a constraint c with the scope s(c) =  x, and the extent e(c) =  
0.
Second, enterprise insiders in some cases may have enough political 
influence to block privatization of their firm, thus the government needs 
to buy their support giving them assets on preferential terms. To capture 
this consideration the domains (d (x ;)) need to have more than two values 
to describe different types of privatization. For example, the Russian 
mass privatization law provided three basic privatization options (modes) 
which differ mainly by the degree of preferential treatment for insiders 
(Boycko et al. (1994), Bornstein (1994)); in this case the domain d(x,) 
may be extended to include four values: one for state ownership and 
three values for the three different privatization modes.
Other concerns of the government, for example, a possible collusive 
agreement between the privatized firms in oligopolystic market, can be 
modeled by introducing additional multivariate constraints and by re­
specifying the variable domains to distinguish, for example, privatization 
with the option to regulate the privatized firm.
The examples above demonstrate that additional considerations can 
be accommodated in the CSOP framework, first, by modifying variable 
domains and extents of the constraints and, second, by introducing more 
(possibly multivariate) constraints. It is easy to see that the first option 
does not affect relative efficiency gains from the decomposition of the 
problem.
A  hinge-tree decomposition of the problem can be found without 
knowing the extents of constraints and the variable domains. A  hinge- 




























































































constraints). Hence the size of the largest minimal hinge in a HT de­
composition (which characterizes the complexity of solving the problem) 
does not depend on a more detailed specification of the domains and the 
extents.
On the other hand, introducing additional constraints adversely 
affects the efficiency gain achieved by the decomposition because it may 
affect the size of the largest minimal hinge in the HT decomposition. 
This is a rather intuitive result. Indeed, the more considerations the 
government wants to incorporate into reform design, the more difficult 
is to find a solution; it becomes more difficult to divide the problem into 
relatively independent sub- problems.
Multivariate constraints can be easily accommodated into a CSOP 
as well. Multivariate constraints transform the problem structure into a 
hypergraph, i.e. a pair (X , S), where 5 =  {s  : s C X }.  However, this 
does not change the solution methods. We can still find a set of consi­
stent assignments by the PB algorithm; the algorithm for finding a hinge 
tree decomposition remains also the same (Gyssens (1994)). Introducing 
additional multivariate constraints in the basic model has the same effect 
as introducing additional binary constraints: additional constraints may 
affect the size of the largest hinge in the HT.
In general then, we can analyze more complicated problems using 
the CSOP framework of the basic model. The problem decomposition 
techniques developed in the paper will still provide an efficiency gain. 
Hence we can rationalize a decentralized administrative structure in a 
more general, richer environment. However, with more additional consi­
derations (constraints) that the government wants to incorporate into the 
optimal reform plan the government’s problem becomes more complex 
(in the sense of computational complexity) and difficult to solve.
8. Conclusions and Further Research
A simple model developed in the paper is based on the idea that an 




























































































that mass privatization in the early stage of reforms helps to overcome 
initial informational problem in the transitional economy. The model 
explicitly recognizes that a decision about the privatization of one firm 
will affect the incentives and behavior of other firms -  in other words, it 
is intended to emphasize a systematic approach to privatization and its 
implications.
I take the point of view that mass privatization hardens the budget 
constraints of privatized firms; it also indirectly hardens the budget cons­
traints of the firms that are linked by trade relations to the privatized 
firms. The hardening of the budget constraints improves the information 
about the profitability of all firms and thus makes easier the sales of the 
remaining state-owned firms to private investors. However, mass privati­
zation leads to the loss of revenues from the divesture of the state-owned 
assets and the government is assumed to take this into consideration. 
Thus mass privatization should be limited and selective.
The optimal privatization plan includes the privatization of some 
set of enterprises by the give-away methods of the mass privatization in 
the first period and privatization of the rest of the firms by conventional 
methods, which create revenues for the government in the second period. 
Finding a set of firms earmarked for privatization in the first period defi­
nes the problem of the optimal sequencing of privatization. This problem 
is defined mathematically in the paper as a constraint satisfaction opti­
mization problem (CSOP). This specification maps the structure of trade 
relations in the economy into the optimal privatization plan.
This simple model allows us to identify the difficulties that the 
government faces if it wants to specify the optimal sequencing of privati­
zation. It is shown that the problem may be impossible to solve because 
the government has to take many related decisions and these decisions 
should be compatible with each other (the government’s problem is shown 
to be NP-complete). This result allows us to formally specify the notion 
of complexity of the optimal reform design and recognize that comple­
xity constraints are binding for the optimal sequencing of privatization 
problem.




























































































complexity problem. The main feature of this method is the decomposi­
tion of the whole problem into a set of sub-problems. In the context of the 
privatization design, decomposition is understood as dividing the whole 
task into a number of sub- problems along the lines that make them 
relatively independent. However, solutions to individual sub-problems 
should be compatible with each other in order to generate an optimal 
global solution. Hence the role for coordination. In fact, it is shown that 
decomposition and coordination substantially reduce the complexity of 
reform design, and thus may be key factors of the successful transition.
Decomposition has two further implications for the structure of 
the government’s decision-making. First, there is a place for a decen­
tralized informational structure. Indeed, decomposition of the global 
problem requires only limited knowledge -  information about the struc­
ture of industrial relations in the economy; then solutions of the local 
sub-problems are computed using only local information. Second, decen­
tralization implies the possible gradualism of reforms in the sense that 
sequential implementation of optimal sub-problem solutions will create 
an optimal global solution as long as the individual local solutions are 
coordinated. However, in each economic region or in each closely related 
by technological links industry there exists a minimum number of firms 
that should be privatized to achieve the government’s objective. This 
provides a justification for the “big bang” privatization programs, that 
call for the immediate privatization of a large number of firms.
Given the importance of the organization of the government’s 
decision-making, a tentative normative implication of the paper would be 
that the government should invest into an efficient (along the lines spe­
cified in the paper) organization of its different administrative branches 
responsible for different parts of the privatization reform. More preci­
sely, a single local agency should be responsible for the privatization of a 
group of state firms that are held together by their location or technolo­
gical specialization. Local administrative units should be subordinated, 
however, to the central government body to insure the coordination of 
their decisions.




























































































but says little so far about the instantiation of the optimal privatization 
plan, i.e. it does not specify a concrete privatization plan which says 
what firms are optimal to privatize first. Such results are pending upon 
the data on the structure of industrial relations in the economy (input- 
output matrix of the economy) and on some plausible estimation of the 
losses that the government can expect from the privatization of each firm 




























































































Appendix A. An Efficient Algorithm for a 
Tree-Structured Problem
The pure backtracking algorithm solves a CSOP in exponential compu­
tational time and a CSOP is an NP-complete problem in general. The 
source of inefficiency of the BP algorithm is identified in section 4 as 
being in the exhaustive enumeration of all consistent assignments. We 
can avoid it for a CSOP with a tree-structured set of constraints by using 
the solution method presented in this section.
The efficient performance of the PB algorithm in finding a single 
assignment / implies that the source of inefficiency of the PB is not an 
extensive backtracking due to the search of the branches of a search space 
that do not contain consistent assignments, but rather the fact that the 
PB finds all consistent assignments including a lot of assignments with 
suboptimal /-values. If we are interested only in the optimal solution (a 
CSOP solution), we do not want the algorithm to generate assignments 
that lead to suboptimal solutions. Hence for better performance in sol­
ving the CSOP an algorithm has to rule out branches of the search space 
that do not contain optimal solutions.
It appears that this can be achieved by combining a consistency 
check with optimization at each computational step that extends a partial 
consistent assignment to include a new variable, i.e. by combining a step 
of the BP algorithm with the optimization step. Moreover, if a problem 
has a special, acyclical structure of constraints, there exists an efficient 
algorithm that finds a CSOP solution in polynomial computational time.
Consider a class of problems (X , C, f ) with an additively-separable 
objective function f ( l )  — E i .e x  / ' (R S (l , Xi)) and a tree-structured graph 
G  =  (X , S ) (where S =  {s (c ) : c € C } ) .  Clearly the dual problem  
defined for the government’s privatization problem (CSOP'p ) belongs to 
this class.
In a tree-structured problem each variable interacts with the rest 
of the problem through a limited number of constraints. This property 




























































































consistency checks at each step. Moreover, a computational step that 
extends a consistent labeling could be combined with optimization due 
to the additive separability property of the objective function. In fact, an 
optimal assignment /* may be composed step by step, using the methods 
of dynamic programming.
I begin formalizing the argument by defining a tree-structured graph 
(JY, S) and its components. First, specify an order of nodes in the graph.
(A . l )  Definition A width-one order -< of the set of nodes X  of a graph 
G =  (X , S) is a total order on set X such that for each node X{ there 
is at most one node Xj -< x, connected to x, by an edge of the graph
((x i,x j) e S).
In other words, under a width-one order each node of a tree-structured 
graph is connected by an edge with at most one node of lower order. A 
width-one order can be generated by depth-first or breadth-first traversal 
of a tree-structured graph in time proportional to the number of nodes 
in the graph (Leeuwen (1990)).
Let X  be ordered by an arbitrary width-one order. The node of the 
smallest order x0 is called a root of the tree. For each x G X  define a set 
of nodes that are children of x: CH(x) =  {y G X  : x -< y, (x, y) G S}. 
In turn, for each node y in CH{x)  ,  x is called a parent(y) node. Each 
node x € X  also defines a sub-tree in G with the root node x. Let ST(x) 
denote a set of nodes of the sub-tree: ST(x)  =  Ux-u CH(z)  u .
A width-one order also defines tree levels. The root node x0 is 
called a 0-level node, children of the root are called first-level nodes, etc. 
Let X 1 denote a set of t-level nodes with a typical element x(]1-.
Now I introduce some more CSOP-related concepts that have stan­
dard counterparts in dynamic programming. For any value i £ d(xtti) 
define a set of xt+ ij  values consistent with a(1: C V (x t+lj ,  a(ii) =  {at+i j  6 
d(xt+i j )  : if 3 c G C  such that s(c) =  xt+ i j )  then (a*;, at+\j) 
€ e (c )}. For any value at j of the variable xtii define a set of partial consi-




























































































stent assignments of values to the nodes in the sub-tree S T (x tti) (or paths 
in the search space): Path(at i) =  { (a tii, . . . ,  am̂ , . . . ,  am +lj, . . . ,  aT |XT|) : 
&m,k € £ C V i %m,k £ Let a par­
tial consistent labeling u(at]i) be a typical element of the Path{at i).
With each value at i G d(xt i ) associate a value v*(at i) which is 
equal to the value of the objective function evaluated on the best partial 
consistent labeling of the nodes in S T (x tii):
« > m ) =  ,  mm £  f ' (RS(u(at i) ,x))  (7)
u(a,ti)ePa ) i e s T ( l i i )
Then the optimal partial consistent labeling of a sub-tree with the root 
node xt i and value at t G d{xt i)  fixed is defined by
u*(atti) =  arg min Y  f '(R S (u (a tti) ,x ) )iesT(l( ()
By construction l* — arg min^e^*,,)/(u*(a0)).
(8)
Function v* can be defined by a recursive method using the principle 
of optimality. More precisely, the following algorithm defines a function 
v which is proved to be identical to v* by propositions (A .3) and (A.4).
(A .2) A lgorithm  (defin ing the optim al value function v)
Input: C SO P =  (X ,C , f )
Output: function v : (Jzgx d(x) x x —* R+
Method:
Step 1.
For each leaf node xieaj  set v(U/„a/) — / (^ieo/) j ''d̂ ieaf £ d(x/eay) .
Step k.
At this point v - values are defined for all values of all variables in X  from 
X T to X t+x. For at]i G d(xtj )  fm dC R (x<+i i;-,atiI),Vxt+1j  G C H (x tii) and
set




v(at+u )  (9 )
If C V (x t+i.j,atii) =  0 remove atj  from d(xti,) 12. Repeat the step k for 
all atii G d(xiti) and all xt i G X 1.
12For CSOPp it is easy to see that CV(xt+itj ,a tti) ^  0 for all X i+i,j G 





























































































Function v* satisfies recursive equation (9).
Proof: By definition v* is a unique function satisfying the following two 
conditions:
!> > < , )<  E  r (R S (u (a tii) ,x ) )  (10)
xeST(ztii)
for all u(atii) G Path(at i) and
t> > , , )  =  E  P iR S H a ^ x ) )  (11)
ze S T (x , , i )
for some u(at.,•) € Path(at<i).
Since the recursive equation (9) is equivalent to
V(at,i) min
at+ i, j  € C V (x t + l j
+  E  v(at+i,j)
x t + i , j € C H (x t,i)
(1 2 )
we can establish the result by demonstrating that v* satisfies (12). 
Function v* satisfies (12) if the following two conditions hold:
«* («(,.) <  /’ («(.i) +  E  v' ( at+i,i) ( 13)
* t+ i,j £ C H (x tli )
for all at+i j  G C V (x t+i j ,a t,i), and
=  / '( « m ) +  E  u* (« (+ i j )  ( 14)
* t+ i,i € C H (x t , i )
for some at+i j  G C V (x t+ij ,a tti).
First show that (10) and (11) imply (13). Take some value at l and 
some values ai+1j  G C V (x t+i j ,  ati,), for all x(+l j- £ C H (x t i). By defini­
tion of Path(at i), 3u(at|,-) G Path(at>t-) such that a(+1j  =  RS(u(atii), Xt+i,j) 
and Path(at+i j )  C RS(Path(atti), . . . ,  xt<\Xt\)-
From (10) follows that
v*(at,i) <  f'{at,i) +  E  E  f '(R S (u (a t,.•),*)) (15)




























































































v*(at + i j )=  f ' ( RS(u(at+ i,j),x )) (16)
iesr(x,+,j)
for some u(at+i j )  G Path(at+i j ) .  Combining (15) and (16) get (13).
It remains to show that (10) and (11) establish (14). Talee some 
value at)i and select some u(at i) G Path(at i) such that equality (11) 
holds for this u(atI) or equivalently
n*(aM) =  /*'(aM) +  £  £  f{R S {u {a t^ x ) )  (17)
z t + i , j € C H ( x tti) x e S T ( x t+ i j )
fo r  a ll u ( a t+ i j )  G P a t h ( a t+ i j ) .
From  (1 1 ) fo llow s that
Take at+1J =  RS(u(at}i) ,x t+lJ) and u(at+hj) =  RS(u(atti),S T (x t+u ) )  
for all xt+i j  G C H (x tli). Since the inequality (10) holds for all u(at+ i j )  G 
Path(at+ i j )  it holds for the selected a(+ lj and u(at+i j )  as well, i.e.
w*(a<+ij) <  H  f\ R S (u (at+1J),x ) )  (18)
*€S T (*1+i j )
From (17) and (18) follows that
> f '(a tti) +  £  v*(at+hj) ( 19)
z«+i.j€crr(*t,j)
for the selected values at+lj- G C V (a( i). Finally, since it is proved that 
(13) is true for all values at+ ij  G C V(atj ) ,  (13) and (19) establish (14). 
Q.E.D.
A .4 Proposition
If v is defined by the recursive equation (9) then v =  v*.
P roo f: Show that (13) and (14) establish (10) and (11).
Take some at i and show that (13) implies (10). By (13)
v(at,i) <  f'(at,i) +  v(at+i,j) (20)




























































































( 2 1 )viat+\,j) <  f ' ( at+\,j) +  v(at+2 ,k)
for all at+2 ,k € C V (x t+2 ,k,at+i,j) or
w(a(,i) <  / '(at,«) +  ^2 ( v(at+2,k) J
x t+ \ , j£ C H (x t,i) \ *t+2,* € C //(x t+i fj )  /
( 2 2 )
for all at+2,k £ C F (x (+2,t, at+ij), Vx(+ lj- £ C H (x tti). This and further 
analogous steps create Path\at i) such that
v(at,i) <  / '(i?5 («(a t,,),x )) (23)
x€5T(x,ti)
for all u(at i) £ Path(at i), that is establish (10). Analogously get (11) 
by iterating (14). Q.E.D.
After finding v-values that uniquely define the optimal value func­
tion v* it is relatively easy to define recursively, starting from the root of 
the tree, an optimal path that solves the CSOP.
(A .5) Algorithm (defining the optimal assignment)
Input: C SO P =  (X ,C , f ) and function v defined by the (A .2).
Output: An optimal path (a j , . . . ,  a*T |Xt|)- 
Method:
Step 1.
Set the value of Xo equal to
a„ =  arg min v(a0) 
ao€</(xo)
Step k .
At this point a partial consistent optimal labeling is created for all 
the variables starting from 0-level of the tree to level t. Find the set 
C V (x t+ij ,a * i) for a’ti £ d(xtj ) ,  and define
a*+1 • =  arg min v(at+i j ) ,  for all xt+Xj  £ C H (xtj )  (24)al+ii,eCV(xt+ll,,aV)




























































































Repeat step k for all xtl £ X*.
Now it remains to show that the optimal path defined by algorithm (A .5) 
is a CSOP solution. Prom (9) and (24) it follows that
v « i )  =  / ' « , ■ )  +  £  v(at+x,j) ( 25)
*1+1,j £CH(xt,i)
And since v is identical to v*
* > * « , )  =  /’’« , )  +  £  v 'W + i j )  (26)
xt+iJ €CH(xt,i)
The following propositions (A .6) and (A .7) establish that a path 
w*(a(>t) solves problem (7) iff its elements satisfy recursive equation (26).
A .6 Proposition
If u’ (a*,) solves the problem
min
U(a*i)er’a(/.(a*i) £ ,x e S T ( z , :j )
f '(R S (u (a ii),x )) (27)
then
* * «+ * ,< )= / *■ («£ m ) +  £  v* (ai+k+i,j) (28)
x‘+k+lj€ai(xl+k,i)
for all k =  0 ,1 ,... ,T  -  (t +  1), where a*+k j =  RS(u*(afi), x) V xt+kj.  
Proof: Since u*(a*{) attains the minimum of the problem (27) the
following equality holds true
* > * « , )  =  f « , )  +  £  £  f iR S iu 'ia l^ x ) )  (29)
x t+ i , jÇ C H (x tli )  x e S T ( z t+ l l j )
Also the by definition of v*
£  f(R S (u (a 't+1}j) ,x ) )  (30)
*€5T(xi+ij )
for all u(a*+l j ) £ Path(a*+ l j ). By construction




























































































Then (29) and (30) imply that
’ » * « < )  > / ■ '« ,- )  +  E  * * K +ij )-  (31)
Finally, since (13) holds for all values at+ € C V (a t]i) and by pro­
positions A.3 and A.4 v =  v*, (13) and (31) establish (28) for k — 0. By 
induction get the same residt for k — 1 ,... ,T  — (t 4- !)• Q-E.D.
A .7 Proposition
If elements of u*(a*;) G Path{a*t i) satisfy
= /•■ («>;+*,■ ) + E v’ (aUk+i,j) (32)
*<+Jk+l,j€C.//(Xt+!fc,i)
for all A: =  0 ,1 ,... ,T  -  (t +  1) where a*t+kj  =  RS(u*(a*t i),x ), Vx(+* j, 
then u*(a(,) solves the problem
min E  / W « « , • ),*))
iesT(i,,i)
(33)
Proof: Iterating (32) gives
v * (a l )=  E  f f ^ K K i ) ^ ) )  (34)
x € S T (x t<i )
and by definition of v*
» * « , ■ ) <  E  / W « K , • ),* )) (35)
x £ S T (x t,i)
for all u^a*^ € Path(a*i). Then (34) and (35) establish (33). Q.E.D.
Taking into account the first step of the algorithm (A .5) we get 
that an optimal path defined by (A .5) solves the problem
m in i . mm V  /‘ ( ^ ( « ( f l o ) , * ) ) }  (36)




























































































which is identical to min/6£ f ( l ) .  That is, (A.5) finds a CSOP solution. 
Hence a tree-structured CSOPp can be solved by the iterative optimiza­
tion method (Algorithms (A .2) and (A.5)).
The efficiency of algorithms (A .2) and (A.5) is accessed by the fol­
lowing proposition.
(A .8 ) P roposition  The overall computational time of algorithms (A .2) 
and (A.5) is bounded by n(k +  2), where n =  |A| is the number of va­
riables and k is the size of the largest domain in a CSOP.
Proo f: First, we need to perform n =  |A| computational steps to
obtain a width-one order of nodes for the graph G — (X , S) (Leeuwen 
(1990)). Next apply algorithms (A .2) and (A.5).
Time complexity of algorithm (A.2):
Let an elementary operation be defined as finding an element of C V (x t+ ij, 
at'i) with the minimum v-value. This is the most costly operation of 
the algorithm which involves checking one constraint c £ C (because 
of the tree structure of the problem) with the scope s(c) — (x t+lj , x t i) 
and finding the minimum element of the set. At each step k the algo­
rithm performs \CH(xt,i)\ elementary operations and it needs to perform 
Y%= o E ;fo ' |d(r(,i)| such steps before it stops. Hence the time complexity 
of the algorithm is YlJ=o Ei=o' |d(x( i)||CH(x(it')| elementary operations. If 
the maximum number of variables in the domain is k, then the worst case 
time complexity of the algorithm is bounded by E?Lo Ei=o' k\CH(xtli)\. 
Since Ŷ [=o E^o' |C’-H’(*t,i)| =  r > where r is the number of constraints in 
the problem, the worst case time complexity of the algorithm is bounded 
by kr or by kn 13 where |X| =  n, i.e. it is polynomial in the size of the 
problem.
Time complexity of algorithm (A.5):
The algorithm essentially performs the same operations as algorithm 
(A .2) but uses only one value a*, from each d(xt i). Hence it requires 
at most E f=0 E ifo ' \CH(xt,i)\ elementary steps defined as before and its 
worst case time complexity is bounded by n.




























































































Hence the overall computational time of algorithms (A .2) and (A .5) 
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